Abstract-In this paper, we present an adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption system featuring constant sized ciphertext in the standard model. The size of the public key and the private keys of our system are both linear in the maximum number of receivers. In addition, our system is fully collusion-resistant and has stateless receivers. Compared with the state-of-the-art, our scheme is well optimized for the broadcast encryption. The computational complexity of decryption of our scheme depends only on the number of receivers, not the maximum number of receivers of the system. Technically, we employ dual system encryption technique and our proposal offers adaptive security under the general subgroup decisional assumption. Our scheme demonstrates that the adaptive security of the schemes utilizing a composite order group can be proven under the general subgroup decisional assumption, while many existing systems working in a composite order group are secure under multiple subgroup decision assumptions. We note that this finding is of an independent interest, which may be useful in other scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
ROADCAST encryption (BE) [1] is a cryptographic primitive in which multiple receivers share encrypted data with a sender. In BE, a sender chooses the set of receivers, adaptively, and encrypts secret data for them. The encrypted data only can be decrypted by recipients included in the set of receivers. BE has many practical applications such as secure databases and Digital Right Management (DRM) systems including DVD and Pay TV solutions.
The security of BE is defined by the security model it follows. A BE scheme is adaptive secure [2] if it allows the adversary to declare the set that he/she wants to attack by using the public parameters and private keys compromised under the restriction that the adversary cannot possess any decryption key of the users in the target set. The selective security [3] , by comparison, requires that the adversary to decide the target set before the system parameters are chosen. Selective security is a weaker notion but it is relatively easier to achieve. Broadcast encryption was extended to identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [4] , [5] in which each receiver is identified by his/her unique identity as in an identity-based encryption (IBE) [6] . As identities are arbitrary bit-strings, an IBBE should support exponentially many users as potential receivers. This implies that for an IBBE to be practical, the size of parameters such as public parameters, private keys and ciphertexts must not be related to the total number of users in the system. IBBE is often simplified to mID-KEM (multiple identitybased key encryption scheme) [7] , [8] which is the cryptographic primitive combining identity-based encryption and mKEM (multiple-receiver key encapsulation Mechanism). In mID-KEM [9] and mKEM, multiple parties share a secret key for their future secure communications to be protected by symmetric cryptographic algorithms.
A trivial solution to broadcast is to encrypt the same message under each receiver's public key. However, this trivial solution possesses a ciphertext size linear with the number of receivers. Thus, the goal of broadcast encryption is to reduce the size. Although there are several realizations in broadcast encryption allowing polynomial users in the system of the ciphertext, achieving an IBBE scheme having efficient sized parameters remains a difficult problem because it has to support exponentially many users in the system using the limited entropy provided in public parameters.
An IBBE should satisfy several important properties. First, an IBBE scheme should be fully collusion resistant [10] , [11] . This property requires that even if all the users collude, they should not be able to learn anything about the message if none of the colluding users is included in the set of receivers for the broadcast. The stateless receivers [12] property is also important for the efficiency of the system. If an IBBE scheme does not have stateless receivers, it must distribute private keys again whenever there is a change in the set of receivers.
In this paper, we introduce an adaptively secure IBBE scheme achieving a constant sized ciphertext in the standard 1556-6013 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. model. Our scheme allows exponentially many users in the system, but the maximum number of recipients in a broadcast is defined in the system setup. Our scheme is also fully collusion resistant and features stateless receivers. In order to prove the adaptive security of our scheme, we use the dual system encryption [13] - [15] . Our IBBE scheme achieves a constant sized ciphertext assuming only General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16] , which is static and simple.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Several existing broadcast encryption schemes [3] , [13] , [17] , [18] achieve constant-sized ciphertext. While they are secure in the standard model, these schemes support only polynomially many users because they have parameters, such as public keys or private keys, which increase linearly with the number of total users in the system. In these systems, the users are normally labelled from 1 to n.
Gentry and Waters [2] suggested the first adaptively secure identity-based scheme having sub-linear sized ciphertext. First, they introduced an IBBE scheme in which a linear sized T ag is included in the ciphertext to allow exponentially many users in the system. Subsequently, they suggested a way to achieve sub-linear sized ciphertext by reusing T ag in the original scheme and increasing the size of other components in a ciphertext from constant to sublinear.
Lewko, Sahai and Waters [19] introduced a revocation scheme based on a revocation system [12] , [20] which achieves broadcast encryption not by including users but by revoking users. The size of the parameters does not depend on the total number of users in the system. However, the size of the ciphertext linearly increases with the number of revoked users in their scheme. In addition, while its parameters do not depend on the total number of users in the system, adaptive security has been proved when it allows a polynomial number of users. The system can only be proven selective secure if exponentially many users are to be supported.
Similarly, an adaptively secure Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme featuring constant-sized ciphertext and supporting exponentially-many attributes was introduced by Attrapadung [21] . As broadcast encryption is a special case of a KP-ABE of which the policy consists only of OR-gates, their scheme is also relevant to our discussion. We analyze this scheme when it works as a broadcast encryption scheme, and we find that our scheme is more efficient than this scheme. The size of the ciphertext and the number of pairing computations for the decryption of our scheme are two thirds of theirs. Also, the security of their scheme depends on some q-type assumptions while our scheme depends on some simple assumptions.
There are three IBBE systems using multilinear map [22] . Due to the properties of multi-linear map, they can be very efficient. However, although the number of the group elements of a ciphertext is constant, the size of the group elements is O(log 2 N). Also, the security of these systems depends on some q-type assumptions, which is undesirable.
Attrapadung and Libert [23] introduced the first IBBE scheme having a constant sized ciphertext as an application of Inner Product Encryption (IPE). Since broadcast encryption can be interpreted as a special case having only OR-gates between recipients, broadcast encryption can be also achieved by IPE. Their scheme is constructed in a prime order group and has a constant sized ciphertext although the sizes of a private key and a public parameter of their scheme linearly increase with the size of maximum number of receivers in the system. To achieve this, they used the dual system encryption. Their scheme depends on standard assumptions (hardness of the Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) and the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)). However, their scheme is designed for IPE and is not well adapted for an IBBE system. Some important features are missing in their construction arising from this matter. The security of their system fails if only one receiver is included in a ciphertext because their n-wise independence argument does not hold. Also, their computataional complexity can be reduced if IPE is used to construct IBBE. They also achieved an adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme by applying the dual system encryption to [24] . However, this scheme requires a subgroup decisional assumption, which cannot be reduced as General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption.
We compare our scheme with the existing schemes, and the result is summarized in Table I . We note that we also use IPE for IBBE as in [23] . Nevertheless, we optimize the IPE scheme to support IBBE. Hence, in addition to a constant sized ciphertext, the computational complexity of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers for a broadcast. Also, we observe that there exists a possible failure in the security if only one receiver is included in a encryption. We provide a practical solution for this. Furthermore, the security of our system depends only on GSD assumption. As a result, our adaptively secure IBBE features low cost decryption by achieving a constant sized ciphertext and low computational complexity for the decryption process. More importantly, our decryption algorithm only depends on the number of receivers of the ciphertext, instead of the maximum number of receivers, which is part of the system parameters. This offers a big advantage in comparison to the other schemes.
A. Our Technique
The traditional way to prove the security of broadcast encryption is using q-type assumptions and partitioning the key space by the set of identities of receivers and others [2] , [3] . The dual system encryption [13] , introduced by Waters, gives a break-through in security proof methodology by introducing the concept of semi-functional keys and ciphertext which are only used in the security proof. However, proving the invariance between a semi-functional key and a normal key is still challenging because the simulator can detect this correlation by generating a semi-functional ciphertext which can be decrypted only by a normal key to distinguish whether the key is a semi-functional key or a normal key.
Dual system encryption is used widely to provide security protocols including BE [13] , [19] , [25] , [26] .
Lewko and Waters [14] suggested a way to solve this problem. In their suggestion, when the algorithm generates a semi-functional ciphertext, the ciphertext is correlated with semi-functional keys. This means if a valid semi-functional key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the semifunctional key does not hinder decryption and works like a normal key, but this correlation between the semi-functional key and ciphertext is hidden to the adversary who cannot query a valid key for the challenge ciphertext.
Although the nominally semi-functionality is very helpful to prove the security, hiding the correlation is not trivial if the system has to support exponentially many users with limited entropy. Lewko and Waters [27] introduced the technique to overcome the shortage of randomness. To amplify the entropy, they localize semi-functional spaces by introducing ephemeral semi-functional space which is only used to prove the key invariance between a normal key and a semi-functional key.
The random values, hiding the correlation between the key and the ciphertext, are only used in ephemeral semi-functional space. Then, the semi-functional spaces share only random values which do not interrupt to hide this correlation in ephemeral semi-functional space.
We prove the security of our scheme similarly with [27] . However, we prove the adaptive security of our system using General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16] only. Specifically, in [27] , when they proved the semi-functional invariance of their scheme, they used an assumption which cannot be reduced to GSD. In contrast, we prove semifunctional invariance without this assumption. Hence, the security of our scheme relies on fewer assumptions than Lewko and Waters' scheme [27] .
Our IBBE scheme achieves adaptive security by combining dual system encryption [13] with n-wise pairwise independence argument [23] , However, the n-wise independence argument does not hold if only one receiver is included in the system. Hence, first we restrict our scheme so that the number of receivers is larger than 1. Then, we provide a practical way to overcome this restriction. The computational complexity of the decryption algorithm of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers.
B. Broadcast Encryption Systems
Our broadcast encryption scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, setup (Setup), private key generation (KeyGen), encryption (Enc) and decryption (Dec) as defined below.
Setup(λ, n, ) takes as input the number of receivers (n) and the maximal size of a broadcast recipient group ( (≤ n) 
It should be noted that the definition of BE above is general enough to describe IBBE.
C. Security Definition
We define the adaptive security model of IBBE. This basically follows the adaptive security model of [2] . The only difference being we adapt it for an ordinary IBBE scheme while the adaptive security model of [2] is for a key encapsulation scheme.
Both the adversary and the challenger are given as input and n, i.e., the maximal size of a set of receivers S and the maximum users in a system, respectively.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(λ, n, ) to obtain a public key PK. It gives A the public key PK. Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b . We define the advantage of an adversary A in attacking the identity based broadcast encryption system IBBE with inputs (n, , λ):
We define that an identity based encryption system IBBE is adaptively secure if Adv A,IBBE,n, (λ) = is negligible for all PPT algorithms A.
D. Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We briefly describe the important properties of composite order bilinear groups which were introduced in [28] . Let G be a group generation algorithm taking a security parameter λ as input and outputting a description of a bilinear group G. For our purposes, we will have G output ( p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , G, G T , e) where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , and e : G 2 → G T is a map such that: g) has order N in G T . We assume that the group operations in G in G T as well as the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ and that the group descriptions of G and G T include generators of the respective cyclic groups. We let G p 1 , G p 2 and G p 3 denote the subgroup of order p 1 , p 2 and p 3 in G respectively. We note that when h i ∈ G p i and h j ∈ G p j for i = j , e(h i , h j ) is the identity element in G T (i.e. e(h 1 , h 2 ) = 1). This orthogonal property of G p 1 , G p 2 , G p 3 will be used to implement semi-functionality in our constructions.
E. Complexity Assumption
Our scheme is adaptively secure under General Subgroup Decision (GSD) assumption [16] . To avoid duplicate statements in the security proof and demonstrate which GSD instances were used clearly, we include Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 which are special cases of GSD.
General Subgroup Decision (GSD) Assumption [16] : Let G(1 λ ) be a group generator and Z 0 , Z 1 , …, Z k be a collection of non-empty subset of {1, 2, 3} where each Z i for i ≥ 2 satisfies either (1) or (2) following
Then, we define the following distribution:
With the fixed collection of sets Z 0 , . . . , Z k , we define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
We define three assumptions as special cases of GSD assumption.
For each assumption, given a group generator G(1 λ ), we define the following distribution:
In some lemmas, the roles of p 2 and p 3 of Assumption 3 are reversed.
III. OUR IBBE CONSTRUCTION
A. Construction
Let i be an identity of a user in the system, and S be a set of identities of recipients for a broadcast. Also we define the maximum number of receivers . We restricted the number of receivers to be greater than 1.
• Setup(λ, , n) The setup algorithm takes in n, and the security parameter λ as input. Then, it chooses a bilinear group G of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 where p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are distinct primes. Then the algorithm generates g, u, w, v, h R ← − G p 1 where G p i is a subgroup of G of order p 1 , and also generates randomly M SK = {δ} in Z N . It outputs
It should be noted that x 0 is fixed as i 0 = 1. However, we leave it in the definition to clarify the correctness. • Decrypt(S, i , d i , CT , P K ) Suppose i ∈ S, and calculate Z , the decryption algorithm outputs
δs Then, it outputs a message M = C/D. Correctness D can be computed as follows:
We restricted our scheme to have |S|. However, this can be accommodated by reserving one identity when system sets up and including this identity if encryption body want to share a secret with only one user. It should be noted that the private key for this reserved identity must not be given to any user.
B. Choice of Parameters
The size of parameters is determined by the security level which a broadcast system aims to achieve. In our construction, N is the product of three primes. The factors of N must not be revealed to the attackers. We recommend the size of N based on the result of Guillevic [29] in Table II for achieving equivalent security levels with AES. The sizes are calculated based on the attacks "Number Field Sieve attack" and "Elliptic Curve Method attack" [30] . The minimum of the size of parameters is calculated based on the cost (time) equivalence, while the maximum of the size of parameters is computed based on the computational equivalence [30] .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to prove the security of our scheme, the dual system encryption was used. The security can be proved by the invariances of security games.
A. Security Properties for the Dual System Encryption IBBE
Before we present the security proof of our construction, we define semi-functional keys and a semi-functional ciphertext which are not used in the real system, but necessary in the proof. In the definition, g 2 , g 3 denotes generators of G 2 , G 3 , respectively. In order to create semi-functional keys, we generate ψ, σ R ← − Z N , first. These are shared parameters in semi-functional keys regardless of the identity of i . Semi-Functional Key:
be a normal key generated by using the key generation algorithm. Then, we randomly selectỹ i R ← − Z N for the identity i and define a semi-functional key as below
Semi-Functional Ciphertext: Let C , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 and C 3 be a properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then, with randomly generated a, b ← Z N , a semi-functional key is defined as below
Semi-functional keys are only able to decrypt a normal ciphertext but not a semi-functional ciphertext although normal keys can decrypt both a normal and a semi-functional ciphertext. Now, we will prove that no PPT algorithm distinguishes the following security games with non-negligible advantage.
Game I B B E Real
This is a real game following the adaptive security model of IBBE. All private keys and the challenge ciphertext are also normal.
Game I B B E k
This is identical with Game I B B E
Real except for the types of private keys and a ciphertext. In this game, the first k keys are semi-functional keys, and the rest of the keys are normal keys and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Game I B B E Final This is identical with Game I B B E q
where q is the total number of key queries besides the private keys. In this game, random elements from G p 3 are added to K 2 , K 3,1 , . . . K 3, components of all semi-functional keys.
Game I B B E
Final This is identical with Game I B B E Final besides the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is similar to the semi-functional ciphertext, but all components except C have additional random elements from from G p 3 .
Final This is identical with Game I B B E Final besides the challenge ciphertext. In this game, the first component C of the challenge ciphertext is replaced by a random element from G T .
Theorem 1: Our IBBE system is adaptively secure under General Subgroup Decision Assumption.
Proof: This is proved by Lemmas 1 to 7. 
. It publishes the public parameters:
Also, B generates normal keys by the key generation algorithm because it knows both P K and M SK . In the challenge, A sends B two messages M 0 , M 1 and the set of receivers, S. To make the challenge ciphertext,
, and implicitly sets g s 1 to be the G p 1 part of T (this means that T is the product of g s 1 ∈ G p 1 and possibly an element of G p 2 ). B also generates t ∈ Z N randomly. It chooses f ∈ {0, 1} by flipping a coin and sets: 
It publishes the public parameters:
When A makes a ciphertext query by sending two messages M 0 , M 1 and the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t, s, a, b ∈ Z N . Then, it randomly selects f ∈ {0, 1} and returns
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , A chooses a random y i , r i ∈ Z N and returns
We let g 
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , B chooses a random y i , r i , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and it returns
2 denote X 1 X 2 . Then, y i equals to y x 1 y i modulo p 1 andỹ i equals to y x 2 y i modulo p 2 and y i modulo p 3 . So, these are properly distributed semi-functional keys.
When A makes a ciphertext query by sending M 0 , M 1 and the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t , t , t ∈ Z N Then, it randomly selects f ∈ {0, 1} and returns
We denote the G p 1 part of T as g τ 1 . This implicitly sets s = τ and t = t + τ t modulo p 1 .
If 3 . If we also denote by G 3 the part of T as g τ 3 , then 1 and h = g 1 . It publishes the public parameters:
When A makes private key queries, for some identity i , B chooses a random y i , r i , γ 0 , . . . γ ∈ Z N and returns 
The random values are properly added into the G 
B. Semi-Functional Key Invariance
It is quite challenging to prove that there is no polynomial time algorithm B to distinguish between Game I B B E k−1 and Game I B B E k with non-negligible advantage because there is no restriction on B. Hence it can generate a semi-functional ciphertext to test whether the kth key is semi-functional or normal by decrypting the semi-functional ciphertext using the kth key. In order to avoid this potential paradox, we designed oracles which output the challenge ciphertext and the private key unless the identities of the keys requested do not belong to the set of the recipients' identities of the challenge ciphertext. However, constructing these oracles and proving the invariance between them is still challenging when we work with exponentially many users because we often have to amplifying the randomness of system with the limited entropy of public keys. Hence, we defined additionally ephemeral key and ciphertext which are similar with the ephemeral semi-functional key and ciphertext introduced in [27] .
In this setting, an ephemeral key decrypts both a normal and a semi-functional ciphertext, but an ephemeral challenge ciphertext is decrypted only by a normal key. Ephemeral key: Let K 0 , K 1 , K 2 , and K 3, j be a normal key generated by using the key generation algorithm. With
Ephemeral ciphertext: Let C , C 0 , C 1 , C 2 and C 3 be a properly distributed normal ciphertext. Then with random a, b, α 0 , . . . , α k , t , t R ← − Z N , and outputs
where α = (α 0 ,..α k ). It should be noted that an ephemeral ciphertext has the parameter σ shared with the semi-functional key. The rest of the proof can be described as the same manner of [14] and [27] . The case 1 can be used to break Assumption 2, and the case 2 can be used to break Assumption 3. and Game I B B E k will be proved by using the oracle lemmas. In the following proofs, B uses oracles to simulate the security games with A, but it cannot distinguish which oracles with which it is working. We define four oracles
Each oracle can response to an initial query, a challenge key query and a challenge ciphertext query. We summarize the relation between the oracles and the security games in Table III .
In order to respond to an initial query, the oracles randomly select g, u, w, v, h ∈ G p 1 and α 0 , . . . , α , s, a, ψ,ỹ, y, σ ∈ Z N and return the group elements:
The responses that each oracle outputs as a challenge key and a challenge ciphertext have different distributions according to the type of oracle. They are distributed as the following: Oracle O 0 : If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity i ∈ Z N , it returns the group elements which are identical with a normal key. Upon receiving a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it calculates Z for S and selects randomly b, t R ← − Z N , then returns the group elements
Oracle O 1 : If the oracle receives a challenge key query for an identity i ∈ Z N , it selects randomly y , r , γ 0 , . . . , γ R ← − Z N , then returns the group elements 
If we write X 1 X 3 as g
3 , this implicitly sets y equal to y x 1 modulo p 1 andỹ equal to y x 3 modulo p 3 . Also, ψ equals y w and σ equals y v modulo p 2 and p 3 . Because the values of y w and y v modulo p 1 do not correlate with their values in modulo p 2 and p 3 , this is properly distributed.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S * , B chooses a random b, t ∈ Z N and returns the group elements
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y ∈ Z N and returns 1 , and h = g 1 . It sends the group elements to A:
This is implicitly sets a = y x 2 modulo p 2 when we write
2 . When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers, S, B responds to A by choosing a random t ∈ Z N and returning
This implies b = y w y x 2 modulo p 2 . a and b are uniformly distributed because y w modulo p 2 does not appear anywhere else. When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y ∈ Z N and returns 
We let X 1 X 3 denote as g
3 . Then, this implicitly sets y equals to y x 1 modulo p 1 . Also, ψ equal to y w sets σ equal to σ modulo p 2 and y v modulo p 3 .
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y , r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and returns
]} This implies that γ 0 = r y u y x 3 modulo p 3 and
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers, S, B responds to A by returning This implies that γ 1 , . . . , γ k are α , Z 
This implicitly sets a = y x 2 modulo p 2 if we write
2 . When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y , r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and returns
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers, S, B responds to A by returning 
Then, the responses of the initial and challenge-key queries can be generated the same way as Lemma 5.1.
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S, B randomly selects s, b, α 0 , . . . , α , t 1 , t 2 and responds to A by returning
}. This is possible because g 2 was given. If we denote g t to be the G p 1 part of T, the G p 1 If the oracle receives a challenge ciphertext query for a set of recipients S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, it selects randomly
then returns the group elements
} It responses to a challenge ciphertext query in the same way as O 2.1 .
Oracle O 2.3 : If the oracle receives a challenge key query for identity i ∈ Z N , it selects randomly y ,ỹ , r , γ 0 , . . . , γ R ← − Z N , then returns the group elements 
This implicitly sets g y 1 = X 1 modulo p 1 . Also, ψ equals y w and σ equals y v modulo p 2 , p 3 .
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random b, t, α 0 , . . . , α , t 1 , t 2 ∈ Z N and returning
α ).
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random γ ∈ Z N and returns
3 , this implicitly sets r = y x 1 modulo p 1 . We note γ 0 = γ y u modulo p 2 and γ 0 = y x 3 y u modulo p 3 , also γ j = γ (−α 0 x j /x 0 + α j ) modulo p 2 and
Let T ∈ G p 1 and g y 1 be the G p 1 part of T , then this matches the distribution of O 2 . If T ∈ G p 1 p 3 (g 1 g 3 ) y is the G p 1 When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and it returns
This is properly a distributed challenge-key. It should be noted that y v modulo p 3 was used but not revealed because there is random parameter γ 0 modulo p 3 which does not appear in any other component. When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t , t , t ∈ Z N and returns
We denote the G p 1 p 2 part of T as g τ 1 g τ 2 . This implicitly sets s = τ and t = t + τ t modulo p 1 . Also, G 2 parts of the challenge ciphertext distribute g
where 
This implicitly sets ψ = y w and σ = y v modulo p 2 and p 3 .
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random b , t , t 4 , t 5 ∈ Z N and returns When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and returns 
Then, initial response, normal keys can be responded by generating them as the same way of Lemma 6.2.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N and returns 
This implicitly sets g y 1 = X 1 modulo p 1 and gỹ 3 modulo p 3 . Also, ψ = y w and σ = y v modulo p 2 and p 3 .
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y , r , γ 0 , . . . γ ∈ Z N and returns 
This is properly distributed if we set
Moreover, this implies that σ = y v modulo p 2 and p 3 .
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of receivers, S, B responds to A returning 
This is properly distributed. Also, ψ = y w and σ = y v modulo p 2 , p 3 . When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y , r , γ 0 , . . . , γ ∈ Z N returns , y u , y w , y v , α 0 , . . . , α , s, a, y, ψ, σ ∈ Z N , and 
When A makes a ciphertext-type query for the set of recivers, S, B responds to A by choosing random t ∈ Z N and returning 1 . Also, the G p 2 part of challenge ciphertext, b = y x 2 y w modulo p 2 . This is a properly distributed ciphertext because y x 2 modulo p 2 does not appear anywhere else.
When A makes a challenge key-type query for some identity i , A chooses a random y , r ∈ Z N and returns B randomly chooses δ ∈ Z N , and gives to A the public parameters,
To create the first k − 1 semi-functional keys, B generates K 0 , K 1 , K 2 , and K 3, j using the key generation algorithm. Then, it randomly chooses δ, y i ∈ Z N and, by using the semi-functional elements in the initial response, constructs semi-functionl keys as:
This implicitly sets y i = y y i + y i modulo p 1 and y = y y i modulo p 2 , p 3 when we let y i be a randomization parameter shared in the first three components of the normal key for identity i . For responding normal keys (> k), B generates normal keys by the key generation algorithm. This is possible because B knows M SK = {δ}. It forwarded a normal key to the A.
If A requests the kth key for some identity i , B makes a challenge key-type query to the oracle with i . Then, oracle returns group elements, {T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , T 3, j : j ∈ [1, ]}. B constructs the challenge key for A as:
If the oracle which B interacts with is O 0 , this challenge key is a properly distributed normal key. If the oracle is O 1 , this key will be a properly distributed ephemeral key. If the oracle is O 2 , this key will be distributed as ephemeral key, properly. If B is interacting with O 3 , this will be distributed as a proper semi-functional key.
When A requests challenge-ciphertext with the set of receivers S for messages M 0 , M 1 , B forwards this query to the oracle and the received group elements (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) . Then B choose f ∈ {0, 1}, and construct the ciphertext as: 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the adaptively secure identitybased broadcast encryption scheme featuring constant size ciphertext. The public parameters and private keys in our scheme increase linearly with the maximum number of receivers, but not the total number of users. Also, the computational complexity of the decryption process of our scheme only depends on the number of receivers. Finally, we showed that our scheme is adaptively secure under the general decisional subgroup assumption instead of multiple subgroup decisional assumptions in the standard model through the use of the dual system encryption technique.
